Small changes can have a big and unintended outcomes in any system.The values attached to a certain mode of operation does not necessarily produce an outcome consistent with that value or values.
In Canada, many think the Prime Minister has too much power in Parliament. Prime Ministers can appoint and dismiss people almost at will, and seem to have a huge ability to set a party’s agenda in Parliament. At the very least, there seems to be a deficiency in a Member of Parliament’s ability to challenge the Prime Minister, even if the MP is in the same party as the PM.
The dynamics of responsible government, that the government must maintain the confidence of the House of Commons through a support of the majority of MPs, make party voting on important issues, or motions of confidence, crucial. Whereas in the United States an election is not triggered when the majority party fails to pass legislation, this can occur in Canada. As it is now, in most cases a loss of confidence would mean an election in Canada. Most prefer to not have elections too frequently, and politicians risk losing power by either being the party to force elections, or having an election during a bout of unpopularity. For this and other reasons, the party line is maintained.
That being said, a loss of confidence does not necessarily mean an election would have to occur. It is wholly possible and constitutional that an MP could approach the Governor General and claim they have the support to form a new government with the current House of Commons. In practice this usually means a shift of power within the majority party in the House. An MP would need the support of their party caucus, members of their party sitting in the House of Commons, to challenge the PM’s government.
This is where the issue arises. Currently, party leaders hold their position not because the party caucus agreed on their leadership. They hold power through various party-wide elections open to all party members, and sometimes even non-members. An example of this would be the recent selection of the Liberal party leader for New Brunswick. There was, more or less, a New Brunswick wide Liberal election for the leader. The base of a party leader’s power then, does not necessarily come from the consent of their colleagues in the party caucus, but from these sorts of party-wide selections.
Because the base of their power does not rest with the support of the caucus, the caucus has less ability to pressure the PM or Premier. Before these party nominations, the people who would have the most say about who is a good leader were those in the caucus who worked with them every day. Canadian parties are moving towards more open party nomination selections with a rhetoric of “democracy” and “participation” and “accountability”. The end result, however, appears to be a government less accountable to those who are closest to it and would supposedly be best able to judge its functioning: our MPs.
An injection of “accountability” at one step of our system has removed “accountability” from another area. We need to be aware of whether or not these values are a good in themselves in all circumstances, and whether it is appropriate to apply them to all structures. In this case, to recognize the value of “accountability” may require a submerging of the value of “democracy”. In an odd way what seems “undemocratic” in a particular could make “democracy” better in the whole.
